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For 50 years positive peace has served as an aspirational goal for many scholars and practitioners of 
peace. However, much recent scholarly literature evidences a substantial ambivalence toward this 
ambition, suggesting that prominent theories, policies and practices in the field have failed to support 
positive peace. This paper argues that a key reason for this failure is the field’s failure to respond 
adequately to the evolving character of conflict (latent and overt) related to technological, legal and 
economic changes associated with the consolidation of globalization over this period. This 
consolidation has served to shrink the distances between previously remote actors, to expand 
exponentially the influence of many institutions, norms, practices and projects as they penetrate new 
societies, to concentrate power into the hands of ever fewer actors, and to reify instead of deconstruct 
endemic inequality and marginalization within states, between states, and across the globe. The failure 
of the field to respond robustly to these changes also prompts concerns about its ability to face 
sweeping challenges soon to come related to technological innovation, climate change, demographic 
shifts, labour automation, and the search for new governance models. This paper, therefore, reaffirms 
the aspirational goals of peace and conflict studies by building on Lederach’s earlier Peacebuilding 
Triangle to propose a Trans-Scalar Peace System which would recognize the need for coherent and 
supplementary policies and actions across scales (global, regional, international, nation, and local) and 
utilize a backward-mapping approach to promote a parity of esteem for actors, institutions and 
decisions at each scale which would, at the same time, privilege the voice of those with the most 
pertinent knowledge, experience, and capacity for action in support of any given policy or practice. 









Introduction: Ambition and Ambivalence in Contemporary Peace and Conflict Studies 
Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) has long been recognized as an inherently normative discipline 
(Boulding, 1978: 343-344). PCS scholars certainly seek to understand the dynamics of peace and 
conflict through empirical study, but they also seek to develop, communicate or apply methods for 
reducing the extent or intensity of violent conflict and broadening and deepening peace. The field has 
grown over the past 70 years, incorporating lessons from a diverse set of disciplines. These include 
Social-Psychology (Kelman & Cohen, 1976; Nadler, Malloy & Fisher, 2008), International Relations 
(Azar & Burton, 1986; Richmond, 2003), Sociology (Coser, 1956; Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012), 
Anthropology (Avruch, 1998; Nordstrom, 2004), Economics (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005; Garfinkel & 
Skaperdas, 2012), Law (Teitel, 2000; Menkel-Meadow, 2004), and Theology (Philpott, 2009). As it 
developed, it also benefited from the activist energies of the Cold War era anti-nuclear proliferation 
movements (see Marullo, Pagnucco & Smith, 1996), and incorporated an array of theories and 
practices from various subfields of scholarship and practice – such as alternative dispute resolution 
(Barrett & Barrett, 2004) and negotiation (Fisher, Ury & Patton 1991). These subfields have all 
contributed ideas and approaches to the contemporary ‘Peace Industry’ (Mac Ginty, 2012: 289), 
which attempts to build peace in conflict affected states around the world.  
 However, while a great diversity of influences contributed to PCS, there are a handful of core 
theories which are central to the field. Although scholars might disagree somewhat on which theories 
would be included in any PCS canon, certainly among the top contenders for inclusion would be 
Allport’s work developing the intergroup contact hypothesis (1954), Coser’s consolidation of Georg 
Simmel’s ideas regarding the functions of social conflict (1956), Sharp’s influential work regarding 
the politics of non-violent action (1973), and Lederach’s more recent proposals regarding elicitive 
conflict transformation (1995). But perhaps the theories most likely to be recognized by all PCS 
scholars as central to the field (for better or worse) would be those of Johan Galtung. Here we would 
certainly include his ABC triangle, which describes all conflict as being composed of a combination 
of attitude, behaviour, and contradiction (1996: 72), as well as the distinction between direct, 
structural and cultural violence (1990). But Galtung’s most enduring contribution is probably the 
related distinction between negative and positive peace, imagined most appropriately as two ends of a 
spectrum wherein negative peace is the absence of direct violence and positive peace is a more 
holistic experience of social justice, reconciliation and community (1969).  
 An array of mechanisms are administered today in societies affected by either latent conflict 
(characterised by indirect or structural violence that marginalizes or harms individuals or 
communities) or overt conflict (characterized by direct violence perpetrated by one group or 
individual upon another), with positive peace as a nominal, if often under-theorized, end goal. 
Included here are processes such as judicial reforms, socioeconomic restructuring, inter-group 
dialogue processes, and political decentralization. Such mechanisms, and many more, are often 
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legitimated, discursively, by their purported contribution to positive peace. However, over the past 
fifteen years, dozens of studies have evidenced how the social orders to which such interventions give 
rise are overwhelmingly built on socio-cultural norms and assumptions emerging from liberal 
philosophies largely of Euro-American origin (Autesserre, 2014). Such interventions assume 
implicitly that peace throughout the world must be built on institutions which mirror those of 
Northwest Europe and North America, or what is described today as the ‘liberal peace’ (Doyle, 2005).  
The vast majority of these cases fail to achieve anything close to positive peace, and have 
instead led to ‘fragile’ outcomes (Paris, 1997), instances of ‘no peace, no war’ (Mac Ginty, 2006), or 
‘quasi-states’ (Milliken & Krause, 2002: 763); all of which fall on the negative peace end of the 
spectrum, ending the overt conflict, but with continuing structural and cultural violence (Luckham, 
2018). These manifest failures, and the tendency of interventions to lead (at best) to continuing latent 
and (at worst) to further overt conflict, have led to a great amount of ambivalence in contemporary 
PCS, perhaps most evident in the sub-field of IR often labelled ‘critical peacebuilding’. This literature 
questions the implicit assumptions within the field and critiques the ability of PCS to understand 
conflict in diverse settings (the positivist tendency within PCS), and to intercede for the purposes of 
building peace (the normative ambitions of PCS) (see Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). In the most 
unsympathetic contributions from this sub-field, peace interventions, and those individuals and 
institutions who promote and administer them, are considered the unwitting agents of a neo-liberal 
global order (Chandler, 2006; Sabaratnam, 2013; Pugh, Cooper & Turner, 2016). These anxieties 
within the field have led to a pessimistic turn and have even prompted calls for more consideration of 
a withdrawal from intervention altogether (Bargués-Pedreny & Randazzo, 2018). 
However, as will be discussed in detail below, a series of international crises in the first two 
decades of the 21
st
 century, and a worrying number of emerging challenges to peace, evidence the 
continuing need for peace work to overcome both latent and overt conflict. The most obvious of these 
challenges are those posed by climate change, but this paper also recognizes the substantial challenges 
which will be posed in the coming decades by changing military technologies, by demographic trends, 
by labour automation, and by the search for new modes of governance (each of which will be further 
elaborated below). Individually, but even more so collectively, these challenges call not for a 
withdrawal, but for an ambitious new framework to encourage new theories and to guide peace work 
appropriate for the 21
st
 Century. This paper, therefore, builds on my earlier work theorizing a Trans-
Scalar Peace System (Millar, 2019) to propose an extension to Lederach’s Peacebuilding Triangle 
(1997) which would meet those ends. Such a system would respond robustly to these onrushing 
challenges by recognizing the need for coherent and supplementary policies and actions across scales 
(global, regional, international, nation, and local) while utilizing a backward-mapping approach to 
promote a parity of esteem for actors, institutions and decisions at each scale which would, at the 
same time, privilege the voice of those with the most pertinent knowledge, experience, and capacity 
for action in support of any given policy or practice. A key goal of this trans-scalar peace system, 
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therefore, is to learn the lessons of the ‘local turn’ while developing a trans-scalar peace system which 
can respond to truly global challenges to peace. 
The first section will briefly note the contemporary “simple” challenges to peace and human 
security which, by themselves, urge an active PCS agenda, before then discussing the emerging 
challenges which face PCS in the coming decades and give rise to complex conflict dynamics across 
scales. The key lessons to be communicated in this section are the ongoing need both for specific 
interventions for the purpose of conflict resolution, transformation, and peacebuilding, and for a more 
robust PCS agenda guided by an understanding of the complex interactions between these various 
emerging challenges across scales. The third section will present an initial proposal for this 
framework, taking as inspiration Lederach’s earlier top-down, middle-out, and bottom-up model of 
conflict transformation (1997: 39). and expanding this into a trans-scalar peace system.  
  
Emerging Challenges to Peace 
Before progressing to discuss the emerging challenges to peace, it is important to note that many 
problematic historical dynamics still generate violent conflict in today. We see this in the 
humanitarian disasters in Syria, Yemen, Algeria and Libya, ongoing since the ‘Arab Spring’ (Vogt, 
Bormann & Cederman, 2016), in the instability of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in the wake of the 
US’ War on Terror, in the ongoing violent conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo or South 
Sudan, and in the continuing need for peace work in, for example, Haiti, Mali, and Myanmar. While 
certainly not ‘emerging’ challenges, all of these cases indicate the importance of a robust PCS agenda. 
In addition, there are also ongoing violent conflicts in states of critical regional importance (such as 
India, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, and Indonesia), as well as the global insecurity associated with 
the new multi-polar global order currently materializing after the relatively peaceful post-Cold War 
period (Schweller, 2011). Particularly worrying features of this re-emergence of great-power rivalry 
include the US’ ‘pivot’ towards Asia (Campbell & Andrews, 2013), and Russia’s newly assertive 
posture towards Europe (Treisman, 2016). While my focus in this article is on ‘emerging’ challenges, 
these examples illustrate that many historical problems remain important. 
A cynic might argue that this list of ongoing challenges evidences the failure of PCS. Such a 
perspective, however, overlooks many positive trends in recent decades in fields directly impacted by 
much peace work, such as advances in human rights, women’s empowerment, children’s protection, 
global development, and the interconnection of non-violent movements across the globe. Such a view 
also underestimates the strength of the forces arrayed against peace work at various scales and the 
conflict dynamics at local, national, international, regional, and global, which have not remained 
stable over time. Indeed, the laws and rules regarding, technologies available for and deployed in, 
resources used and acquired during, and underlying motivations for violent conflict have shifted 
significantly over the past 70 years. Existing or emerging violent conflicts, therefore, are not clear 
evidence of a failure of PCS, but should serve as lessons regarding the fluid character of peace and 
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conflict dynamics over time. It is also true, however, that the evolution of the character of both latent 
and overt is something which PCS must become far more aware of and responsive to if it is to 
successfully face the more complex conflict dynamics of the 21
st




Changes in military technology have always driven new forms of violence. But PCS scholarship 
rarely recognizes the fundamental character of these changes and the manner in which technological 
evolution influences other aspects of conflict. The transition away from relatively short distance 
killing between the start of the 20
th
 century and the start of the Cold War, for example, not only 
increased exponentially the distance at which the authors of violence could target their victims – from 
the range achieved by cannons to that achieved by Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) – but it 
also increased exponentially the extent of damage and the number of deaths possible, while achieving 
a never before imagined psychological distancing from that damage and death (Gregory, 2011). This 
increasing possibility of ‘death from a distance’ altered the normative, moral, and ethical dimensions 
of war (ibid: 192).  
 A similar revolution seems upon us today. This is evident in the increasing prominence of 
cyber warfare (Valeriano & Maness, 2014), in the capabilities of drones and ‘smart’ weapons 
(Hammes, 2016), and, perhaps most worrisome, in the emergence of autonomous weapons systems 
(Krishnan, 2009). All of these new developments in the capabilities of military technologies – leaving 
aside the terrifying implications of more speculative technologies such as virtual warfare, space based 
weapons platforms, or nano-biological weapons (Altmann, 2004, 2007) – are also altering the 
normative and ethical principles of warfare, much as ICBMs did in the last century. They raise 
questions about the meaning of security and peace, the moral accountability of individuals, groups, 
states, and society for new forms of violence, the necessity and viability of new tactics and strategies 
for defence, and how the character of social conflict will evolve in response. 
 
Climate Change 
While a handful of PCS scholars have been calling for more attention to climate change for some 
years (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994), this research has only recently gained traction. Indeed, PCS 
scholarship is still at odds about whether climate change is related to violent conflict at all (Gleditsch, 
1998; Adams et al, 2018). However, as climate scientists predict that the changing climate will impact 
many of the variables most fundamental to social conflict dynamics – such as the availability of water, 
of food, and of arable land (Hanjra & Qureshi, 2010; Turral, 2011) – it is very likely that this will, at 
the very least, contribute to the various motivating factors prompting such conflict. It is very hard to 
imagine wholesale changes to the availability of resources, predicted to impact some of the world’s 
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most impoverished regions (Rosenweig & Parry, 1994; Roberts & Parks, 2007), not resulting in 
increased social conflict, either directly or indirectly (Barnett & Adger, 2007). 
 Indeed, the recent cases of ‘climate refugees’, particularly from small and low-lying island 
nations in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific, may be the first clear sign of what is to come (Farbotko 
& Lazrus, 2012). A less direct, but nonetheless worrying crisis, can be seen in the continuing trans-
Saharan and trans-Mediterranean migration, which, while driven also by other factors, have been 
exacerbated by changes to the productivity of land and the availability of food and water (Werz & 
Hoffman, 2016). Similarly, although disputed (Selby et al, 2017) many have linked the conflict in 
Syria with the rising price of food, driven by prolonged drought conditions (Cole, 2015; King et al, 
2015: 121). While the influence of climate change on social conflict is yet to be settled, and may be a 
contested issue for some time as it is an economically and politically divisive topic, many scholars 
today are coming to believe that the character of peace and conflict over the coming decades (both 
latent and overt) will be fundamentally influenced by these dynamics. 
 
Demographic Shifts 
A further challenge often overlooked is the global ‘youth bulge’ (Urdal, 2006; Sommers, 2011) and 
the divergence in demographic trends between the Global North and the Global South. Rates of 
reproduction have long since peaked in much of the former, and many wealthy countries of the North 
are today home to aging populations and service dependent economies (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2014). 
Alternatively, many countries of the Global South are experiencing substantial population growth. It 
has been reported that 62% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa is under 25 (Bongaarts, 2009: 
2988), the natural growth rate of the continent is still far ahead of any other region of the world 
(Gerland et al, 2014), and the population density is set to more than double by 2050 (Cohen, 2003: 
1173). These dynamics are mirrored, although less starkly, in Latin America and South and Southeast 
Asia. Much like climate change, the overall impact of these demographic trends over the coming 
decades is hotly debated. 
While some see a youth bulge as an opportunity for economic growth (Bloom et al, 2007), 
others see an expanding population of youth as a threat to peace (Urdal, 2006; Sommers, 2011). 
Certainly, there is good reason to be concerned, particularly as those states and regions with the 
largest youth bulges are also those on the periphery of the global economy, and often characterised by 
high unemployment rates, extreme poverty, massive inequality, and endemic corruption. Such states 
are more likely to be quite weak and weak states are exactly those without the institutional strength to 
turn a Youth Bulge into an economic dividend (Ashford, 2007), are more likely to become the focal 
point for organized criminal networks and terrorist organizations, and the dynamics they exemplify 
spur wider ‘internationalized’ conflict dynamics across whole regions (Patrick 2011). There is good 






The unclear impacts of labour automation on patterns of global production, employment, and 
inequality are yet another emerging challenge. While some have studied this for quite some time 
(Rifkin, 1995), it has only recently emerged as a real concern for policymakers as studies have 
considered the implications of whole industries switching to automated machine labour (World Bank, 
2019). One of the most substantial concerns here, unrecognized so far within PCS, is the potential 
exponential growth in inequality as the owners of capital capture all of the added value of production 
processes with little redistribution occurring even through the traditional mechanism of wage labour 
(Harris, Kimson & Schwedel, 2018: 37). If such an automated model is truly the future of many 
service and manufacturing jobs, as many predict (Chui, Manyika & Miremadi, 2016), then even the 
wealthy states may play host to substantial social conflict in the coming decades and alternative 
models of resource distribution, currently being tested (Tondani, 2009), may be required. 
 But if this is a challenge for the wealthy Global North, in states unable to afford such schemes 
it will be a disaster. Such states, particularly many in Asia and Central America, have become the 
factories of the world in the past 30 years (Kollmeyer, 2009), and manufacturing of export goods is 
today the lifeblood of hundreds of millions who have become dependent for employment on the 
expanding manufacturing sectors in and around cities in those countries (Henderson, 2010). In such 
cases, where recent and rapid urbanization of the society and liberalization of the economy have 
removed populations traditionally dependent on farming from their land, the impact of a mass move 
towards automation would be catastrophic. The sudden loss even of those precarious and badly payed 
employment opportunities would compound existing inequalities, increase marginalization and 
disempowerment (Norton, 2017; Schlogl & Sumner, 2018), and increase ‘waste life’ (Duffield, 2007: 
9). This, yet again, is a challenge made only more troubling given the institutional weakness of most 
of the states in which these problems are likely to unfold. 
  
Alternative Governance  
Finally, the emerging search for alternative forms of governance capable of managing all of the above 
seems a challenge onto itself. We see evidence of this in discussions of the decline of the liberal 
model in the wake of the 2008 financial collapse (Hans, 2013; Harcourt, 2013), the emergence of an 
alternative centralised Chinese model (Li & Wang, 2013), or the re-emergence of nationalist and 
authoritarian forms of governance (Saull, 2015). What we are facing, in short, over the coming 
decades and in the wake of this disruption of the post-Cold War status quo, is likely to be a sustained 
period of contestation between models of governance (which has already begun and has recently been 
accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic), which may at times be violent, but which will also include 
periods of less violent but nonetheless conflictual relations; likely quite similar to the Cold War. In 
short, this is unlikely to be a peaceful process. 
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Indeed, there have been periods of tension historically when global powers have waned 
relative to their emerging competitors (Ikenberry, 2008). But the coming shift may be more difficult 
to navigate because it will not be a shift of relative power between states within a stable system (the 
nation-state system), but a shift in response to the transition and evolution of the system itself as the 
influence of the state wains. Multinational corporations, supra-national institutions, and global Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) have emerged as key actors on the international stage, they have 
increasingly penetrated the sub-systems of global politics, economics, and social engagement over the 
past 25 years, and the impacts of this penetration foster new interactions and many of the trends noted 
above (Risse, 2007).  Any new form of governance, therefore, must be capable of understanding and 
managing not only the relationships between nation states, but also those between these newly 
emerging global actors. This challenge is yet to be sufficiently addressed. 
 
Complex Global Conflict Dynamics 
A key point that needs to be highlighted, however, is that these trends (and there are certainly more) 
interact and coalesce in dynamic ways, leading to nonlinear interactions, feedback loops, and 
emergent self-organization; dynamics which characterize the entire system, as they do all complex 
adaptive systems. As should be evident in the short descriptions above, each of these five challenges 
interacts with the others; their impacts are comingling, their effects compounding. Climate change and 
demographic trends may interact to multiply their individual influences on urbanization and the 
demand for employment in cities. This multiplied demand may contribute to social inequalities 
resulting from mass automation and spark increased demand for alternative models of governance and 
resource distribution. Governments attempting to respond may deploy new military technologies 
either positively, to respond to these demands, or negatively to quell dissent and maintain power via 
means of surveillance or repression, for example.  
Therefore, while each of these trends will itself be a substantial challenge for PCS, it is the 
complexity derived from their interactions that is the real concern. It is this complex interaction across 
the global, regional, international, national and local scales that so complicates efforts towards 
positive peace employed at any particular scale or in any specific case. This is because, as the 
literature on complexity within PCS has made clear, the nature of such complex systems seems to 
breed unpredictable outcomes (Chandler, 2013; de Coning, 2016; Millar 2019) and, thus, to 
fundamentally disrupt any linear plans for supporting positive peace. It is this complexity of 
interaction across scales which inspired this rethinking of positive peace as a trans-scalar peace 
system. And, indeed, as will be described below in the discussion of ‘attractor dynamics’ (Vallacher 
et al, 2011), this approach can go some way to addressing the unpredictability inherent in complexity. 
 
A Trans-Scalar Peace System 
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It is hardly original to note that PCS (theory, policy, and practice) has been experiencing a crisis in the 
past fifteen years. Indeed, after the optimism of the post-Cold War period – in which the 
contemporary form of peace intervention became standardized (Sending, 2009) – the ‘peace industry’ 
has come under a withering critique. Much of this critique has been focused on the nature of peace 
interventions as externally imposed processes designed, funded, planned and executed by a variety of 
international actors, including various supranational institutions such the UN, EU, African Union, and 
World Bank, as well as the international development agencies of many powerful states of the Global 
North. Included here also are the thousands of CSOs and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
which have formed in the past 25 years for the explicit purpose of building peace, or have folded this 
purpose into earlier missions such as international development or humanitarian relief.  
 One point shared by many of the critiques is that such externally driven peace projects fail to 
engage with or understand the needs and expectations within local communities impacted by violent 
conflict, or the inherent capacities within local societies for building a sustainable peace (Lederach, 
1995). Many early contributions to this critique focused on the lack of ‘ownership’ of the process in 
local communities (Donais, 2009), and a substantial literature has described the problematic outcomes 
of peace interventions of this type, which rarely produce what liberal peace proponents imagined they 
would (Doyle, 2005). Many authors highlight the hybrid nature of such outcomes (Mac Ginty, 2010; 
Millar, 2014), the frictions inherent in the interaction between international and local actors 
(Björkdahl et al, 2016), and the unpredictable nature of both the processes and results of peace work 
within what are always complex contexts (De Coning, 2016). Scholarship in this vane is often broadly 
labelled the ‘local turn’ (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Paffenholz, 2015), as it consistently argues 
that understanding local context and culture and empowering local actors must be central to the 
processes and outcomes of peace work (see Bräuchler, 2015; Millar, 2018a). 
 However, as much as this refocusing on the local was completely necessary, it is also 
recognized that the field cannot only focus on the local and exclude the global, regional, or 
international actors (Richmond, 2011; Millar 2019). Indeed, while most violent intergroup conflict is 
facilitated by, or even directly fostered by regional and international actors (Kaldor, 2012), those 
actors have also sometimes been central to peace. Indeed, the complex dynamics described as 
producing global systems of conflict operate to incentivize violence across scales (Keen, 2006), so it 
holds that ensuring positive peace for all will demand peace work across scales. The very local 
dynamics that have been shown to drive violent conflict in dozens of specific contexts, such as 
inequality, lack of opportunity, and marginalization (Archibald & Richards, 2002; Kalyvas, 2006), are 
mirrored across scales, wherein certain states and populations are less than equal to and marginalized 
from others. Purely localized bottom-up peace processes or efforts will not overcome these dynamics. 
 It should be clear, of course, that what we are talking about here are experiences – across 
scales – of structural violence. There may be few (often no) actual wars between states in any given 
year, and even the number of intra-state conflicts has declined since the 1990’s, but neither is there 
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positive peace. This is true within many states, where inequality and marginalization are common, but 
it is even more-true between states, and particularly between regions, as some hold most of the power, 
the resources, and the influence (North America, Europe, East Asia), while others hold almost none. 
At the scale of the state this situation of gross inequality is evidenced in manipulative bilateral trade 
deals between nations differently positioned in this structure, in the hugely varying levels of influence 
such states wield even in ostensibly democratic global bodies such as the UN, and in global 
differentials of military might. But even on an individual scale, this is evident in the greater value 
assigned to the lives, experiences and rights of those located in the wealthy states of the Global North.  
 
Figure 1: Lederach’s Peacebuilding Pyramid 
 
In short, across scales, structural inequality ensures that negative peace is the prevailing order 
of the day, and even as the structural violence of the global system has become clear, PCS theory, 
policy, and practice, whether top-down or bottom-up, has remained focused on building peace within 
states instead of on challenging the unequal structures at the global or international level. While the 
theoretical literature largely recognizes today that conflict systems are global, PCS has not provided 
many ideas about how peace practice might overcome these scalar limitations (see Millar 2019). But 
if the above argument is correct, then the only way to generate experiences on the positive peace end 
of the spectrum is to implement peace processes within supportive global and regional structures 
which are facilitative of national and local peace projects. If the structures at the higher scales are not 
consistent with and supportive of the practices and projects implemented at the more micro scales, 
then positive peace outcomes are highly unlikely. Such a trans-scalar peace system, therefore, is 
hugely ambitious in demanding convergence across scales, but this proves necessary to have any real 
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hope of building positive peace within an interdependent global system. Indeed, while ambitious, the 
trans-scalar peace system I propose has precedent within PCS theory, both as it builds on the tradition 
of establishing aspirational goals and frameworks for the field, and as it borrows from one of the most 
influential such approaches; Lederach’s top-down, middle-out, bottom-up model (Figure 1).  
This earlier approach, and its later development into a ‘web’ structure (Lederach, 2005), 
demanded similar consistency of purpose from actors across scales and illustrated the need for 
policies and decisions on the higher scales to provide the structure to facilitate action and commitment 
at lower scales (1997: 39). Lederach’s model also evidenced the clear importance of those in the 
middle connecting the efforts of the ‘top-down’ and ‘grassroots’ bottom-up approaches and argued in 
support of a holistic approach to achieving a more positive or socially just peace. As such, this model 
served, at the time, both as a new framework for theorizing about peace, and a model for how to better 
implement peacebuilding processes. However, one of the key limits of this model is that it is purely 
focused on domestic dynamics within a single state (see Paffenholz, 2014: 16). It was not developed 
for reaching outside the nation to the broader structures of the global system which must today be 
recognized as among the most powerful drivers of contemporary violence. What I propose, therefore, 
is to build on this model in two ways. First, to expand the model from a purely intra-state approach to 
one that can also address dynamics of structural violence at the regional and global levels. And 
second, to remedy Lederach’s initial privileging of the ‘middle-out’ with a parity of esteem for actors 
and decisions at each scale which functions to empower those with the most pertinent knowledge, 
experience, and capacity for action at each specific scale.  
While the challenges to such an approach are enormous (as was true also for both Galtung’s 
‘positive peace’ and Lederach’s ‘elicitive approach’), the development of such a trans-scalar peace 
system should be seen as an appropriately ambitious or aspirational goal for PCS in the 21
st
 Century. 
To put it bluntly, conflicts of the 21
st
 century are already being driven by deeply complex and truly 
global dilemmas, including evolutions in military technology, climate change, demographic shifts, 
labour automation, and the search for alternative models of governance. To address these emerging 
challenges to peace it is, therefore, imperative that peacebuilders understand such complex 
interactions. Our global systems of communication, transport, production and consumption are trans-
scalar, and while these systems have driven enormous expansion in levels of production and 
consumption – increasing the accessibility of imported foods and finished goods for many – they have 
also resulted in increased exploitation and expropriation of resources (Sassen, 2013; McMichael 
2013) and the manipulation of individuals and communities (Millar 2016). In other words, the global 
system today tends to produce negative peace and, too often, contributes to conflict trends. It is in 
desperate need of reform, and this is perhaps why so many countries are today struggling with 
questions of representation, inequality, and the challenges of post-liberal governance in an age of 
advanced globalization.  
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The trans-scalar peace system proposed (see Figure 2) provides one way to conceive of such 
an alternative form of peace work that neither ignores the challenges of a complex interdependent 
global society (as seems the wont of contemporary nationalists), nor falls victim to the over-confident 
exuberance that became the hallmark of the neo-liberal peacebuilding model that dominated the post-
Cold War years. But I cannot stress enough that key to striking this balance and avoiding this 
approach simply being another means of resource capture and exploitation, or liberal peace 2.0, is 
recognition of and respect for the central lessons of the ‘local turn’. It is imperative that understanding 
local context and culture is central to the processes and outcomes of peace work, so that the voices, 
experiences, capacities and needs of global, regional, international, or even national actors can never 
be allowed to indiscriminately outweigh those of the local. Instead, the individuals, communities, 
institutions and organization most likely to influence peace and conflict dynamics at each scale 
(whether positively or negatively), must be those most engaged and involved in making decisions and 
taking actions at particular sites and at each scale of peace work. A trans-scalar peace system, 
therefore, must incorporate something more akin to a parity of esteem for the ideas regarding, 
capacities for, and approaches to peace across the scales.  
 




The ambivalence experienced in the field today is a reflection of the negative findings 
regarding the outcomes and impacts of peace work in many countries over the past 25 years. As 
noted, the disjunction between what powerful and influential actors plan, fund, and implement for the 
purpose of supporting positive peace, and the unpredictable and often unexpected nature of the 
eventual impacts and experiences of those projects at various scales (primarily local and national), has 
undermined the normative ambitions of the field; generating instead a worrying pessimism, perhaps 
even nihilism, within the field. The primary drivers of these anxieties, in short, are issues of power 
and complexity. By power I mean specifically the distinctly uneven influence over decisions about or 
the ability to incentivize or enforce certain practices or processes, and by complexity I mean the 
unpredictability of emergent self-organization within adaptive social systems. I propose this trans-
scalar model not in an effort to ignore or dismiss these anxieties, but as a means by which to 
circumvent the challenges from which they arose (power and complexity). The trans-scalar peace 
system achieves this by incorporating the process of “backward mapping” as a means of 
empowerment and a focus on “attractor dynamics” in response to complexity. 
To explain how the model can serve to overcome anxieties in the field, let us first imagine an 
intergroup conflict between ethnic communities within a small region of one country, which is being 
effected by cross-border co-ethnics and driven by inter-group inequalities of wealth intensified by 
global resource exploitation. There will clearly be many dynamics across scales which must be 
addressed in order to build peace in this case. There are those at the very local level of the two 
communities, as well as the international level across borders, and at the global level at which 
commodities are exchanged. But in the primary models available today solutions to such conflict are 
generally developed either by international actors who then impose them on those local communities, 
or – in the ‘transformative’ tradition – within the state and across the domestic scales of elites, mid-
range leadership, and local people. They either privilege the insight and practice of the international 
and perceive the local as the problem (Richmond, 2009: 152), or they limit the sphere of intervention 
to the sub-national level and ignore the global and international structures. What these models clearly 
do not do is provide a coherent approach which allows the global, regional, international, national, 
and local scales to work in a complementary fashion and which might therefore serve to provide 
macro structures to support or facilitate micro processes or actions for peace. 
One way to accomplish this is through ‘Backward Mapping’, which privileges those actors 
located most in proximity to implementation at each scale in planning, designing and implementing 
policy action at that scale (Elmore, 1979/1980). Actors at the scale most pertinent to the specific 
policy to be implemented are privileged in informing and designing the eventual structure of policy or 
the necessary procedures to address the challenge at that scale. In this way, backward mapping 
provides a means to provide, overall, a parity of esteem across scales – although for any specific 
problem at a given scale a particular actor or institution must necessarily be privileged. In the conflict 
example outlined above that might mean privileging international actors in devising policies to ensure 
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more equal distribution of wealth from resource exploitation, privileging national level leaders in 
developing plans to establish a less antagonistic interaction between ethnic groups across borders, 
privileging local level ethnic leaders in shaping efforts towards reconciliation between ethnic 
communities, and privileging individuals and communities on the ground in choosing how exactly to 
carry forward such efforts. As such, backward mapping would provide greater influence in the design 
and planning to conflict affected communities; including substantive input into the ‘telos’ or purpose 
of peace work itself (Denskus, 2012: 151). 
Incorporating backward mapping into the trans-scalar peace system proposed, therefore, 
means that the global or international actors distanced from the scale of implementation, would not be 
empowered to set agendas for programmes and define the end goal of peace, but would be required to 
take their lead from those at the scale of implementation. In a reversal of the usual power dynamics in 
which formal authority travels from the top-down, but therefore also fails to have predictable 
outcomes on the ground, in the trans-scalar model proposed authority would derive ‘from expertise, 
skill, and proximity’ and travel ‘in the opposite direction’, from the bottom-up (ibid: 606). Backward 
mapping, in short, would demand that we recognize and privilege expertise for policy implementation 
and practice not at the higher scale of funding, but on whatever scale implementation will happen, and 
that we would, therefore, very often need to privilege local or indigenous knowledge because ‘the 
problem-solving ability of complex systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximizing 
discretion at the point where the problem is most immediate’ (Elmore, 1979-80: 605).  
But backward mapping cannot, on its own, provide a solution to the broader challenges posed 
by the complexity of conflict systems (whether latent or overt) and, indeed, the problems associated 
with non-linearity, feedback loops, and emergent properties would remain even if local, indigenous, 
or marginalized groups were newly empowered to make central decisions regarding peace work. 
Indeed, it is distinctly possible, given the social and cultural divergence between actors operating at 
different scales, that backward mapping could work against the principle of convergence and eventual 
coherence across scales. What is necessary instead is some way to combine a privileging of the most 
pertinent actors at the scale of project implementation, with a collective and coherent vision for peace 
work in a given case which can guide activity across the scales within the system. This is where the 
notion of ‘attractor patterns’ may be of assistance, particularly as they allow us to imagine both how 
systems settle into specific patterns of violence or peace (Coleman et al, 2017; Vallacher et al, 2011), 
and to theorize about how peace work might encourage systems to shift from one attractor state 
(characterized by violence) to another (characterised by peace).  
Attractor patterns can be thought of as stable or equilibrium states at which systems settle, 
and which are defined by or develop their characteristics as a result of the interaction between the 
multiple elements of the system itself and the broader systems in which it is nested and with which it 
is interrelated. Such attractor patterns are like the comfortable rhythms, habitual behaviours or 
everyday routines that we all follow, maintained by the mundane schedules and requirements of our 
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lives; the reasons (surely multiple) that you engage in particular chores on a given day each week, or 
run into a neighbour on the street at approximately the same time each morning. The adaptive social 
system that encompasses your lifeworld has settled into a particular attractor pattern and any elements 
of that system, and the systems in which it is nested, collaborate (although with no intentionality) to 
maintain that stable or equilibrium state. The ‘elements’ of the system unknowingly fall into this 
pattern and then maintain it over time.  
Building awareness of this idea into trans-scalar peace systems is one way to promote the 
convergence of goals and motivations across the scales and so, to promote a commitment among 
actors on the higher scales to facilitate a consistency with and support for the practices and projects 
implemented at the more micro scales. Developing such coherence, however, is a slow iterative 
process by which initially intentional convergence becomes habitual coherence that results in the 
system as a whole settling into a peaceful attractor pattern which, by its very nature, would then 
function to reaffirm and reassert the established rhythms of that pattern; i.e. of a stable trans-scalar 
peace system. While the recognition of the implications of complexity for peace work have largely 
inspired ambivalence within the field, this reflects the focus over the past 15 years on the failures of 
top-down planning and implementation, and not a full recognition that peace systems too are 
complex. It downplays or even ignores the fact that there are many promising examples of stable 
peace systems in the world today (Verbeek and Peters, 2018), and that we can, with foresight and 
effort, develop our capacity as peace workers to assist in the development of trans-scalar peace 
systems elsewhere. It is certainly true that any habitual coherence to a trans-scalar peace system 
requires an unlikely revolution in the thinking of global power holders. But in the face of truly global 
challenges such as climate-change and the Covid-19 pandemic we are already seeing revolutionary 
ideas take root in the form, for example, of the Green New Deal and calls for more coherent global 
health policies. We time is ripe, in short, for revolutionary ideas. 
 
Conclusion: Peace and Conflict Studies in the 21
st
 Century 
The key lessons from this paper are simple. First, while there is today quite a lot of ambivalence 
regarding the ability of PCS as an academic field, and peacebuilding as a practice, to contribute to 
positive peace, the most critical arguments suggesting that we consider a withdrawal from peace work 
must be resisted. As discussed above, many contemporary conflict-affected societies evidence the 
continuing need for engaged PCS theory, research, policy, and practice; to the extent that a 
withdrawal would be hugely detrimental. Further, as discussed, there are also many more complex 
and emerging dynamics which will be major drivers of both latent and overt conflict in the coming 
decades (five specific examples were described here) and which, in their mutual interaction, call not 
for the restraint of our ambition, but for robust engagement with the forthcoming challenges of the 
21
st
 Century. The challenges of today, and certainly those of tomorrow, are substantial. New 
generations of PCS scholars and practitioners must be prepared to meet them. 
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 As was made clear in the final section, while we must recognize the failures of the overly top-
down and imposed nature of the ‘liberal peace’ model and acknowledge the central importance of 
bottom-up needs, expectations, and capacities, conflict systems are today global. No longer are 
conflicts (latent or overt) best seen as intra- or inter-state, and even the accepted middle ground idea 
of the ‘internationalized conflict’ fails to capture the truly complex global dynamics that are driving 
the prominence of negative peace (mass inequality and marginalization) which inspires and 
exacerbates specific cases of direct violence at different scales. The long-recognized changes in 
technology, law, and economics which have driven the evolution in the character of conflict over 
recent decades have resulted in a truly trans-scalar conflict system which reifies unequal systems of 
power and resource distribution (both domestically and globally), and the only way to tackle such 
challenges and work towards a truly positive peace, is to work, somehow, at a global scale to 
encourage the evolution of trans-scalar peace systems. 
 I recognize the apparent paradox of this argument; that we must take fully on board the 
lessons of the ‘local turn’ and prioritize the needs, expectations and capacities of those in settings of 
conflict while, at the same time, working to develop global trans-scalar peace systems. But, as 
articulated, Lederach’s model for trans-scalar conflict transformation within a conflict affected state 
can serve as a very useful starting point for developing a global trans-scalar peace system. Such a 
model recognizes the manner in which structures from higher scales delimit actions and options on 
lower scales, and how actors at middle levels can serve to communicate and translate between levels. 
If such a model is extended out to include also the international and the global, and if the needs, 
expectations, capacities, desires, opinions and ideas of actors at specific scales are given priority in 
framing the policies and practices for which they are responsible for implementation, then such a 
trans-scalar peace system may knit together the many scales necessarily involved in peace 
interventions with an initially intentional convergence across scales developing into a more habitual 
coherence, and, thus, avoiding the imposition and neo-colonial tendencies common in the post-Cold 
War years dominated by the liberal peace model. 
 The hope is that such a trans-scalar peace system can unite specific local needs with broad 
global norms. In so doing, we might manage to craft locally salient but globally applicable peace 
theory and practice which positions those at scales distant from implementation only as facilitators of 
or advisors to other’s peace, conceived, planned, and built by those others, but within the context of 
structures, norms, and systems which are designed to actively support what those at the level of 
implementation consider desirable. This is the central purpose of the ‘backward-mapping’ approach; 
to have decisions regarding norms, rules, and structures guided by those at the coalface (Millar, 
2018b). This demands, it must be recognized, a level of humility, openness, reflexivity and self-
critique which has thus far seemed extremely difficult for many policymakers, scholars, and 
practitioners, and this will prove a formidable challenge. Such a model is, therefore, keeping with the 
best of PCS tradition in asking us to accept ambitious goals in the face of overwhelming challenges. 
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Indeed, while positive peace has often been critiqued as ill-defined and unattainable, it is exactly as an 
aspirational goal that it has been most useful. In times of powerful global anxieties, PCS must move 
forward with genuinely global aspirations and rethinking positive peace as a trans-scalar peace system 
can be a first step. 
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